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GREEN & BERRY
FREDERICK N. GREEN (1240)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5650
IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS
JILL FAIRBANKS,
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS,

Case No. 950371-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal properly lies with the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Ann. (1953
as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issue presented is whether the Court erred in
determining that the provision of the Decree of Divorce which
requires the Defendant to compensate the Plaintiff for her
increased income tax liability if he claims the dependency
exemptions should be based upon her actual married-joint filing
status.

The trial court determined that the economic reality of

the circumstances included the Plaintiff's filing of a marriedjoint tax return for the tax year 1993 for which she is jointly
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and severally liable and which formed the basis for determining
the Plaintiff's tax liability.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The trial court7s decision to enforce the parties7 agreement
should not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of
discretion.

Zions First National Bank v. Barbara Jensen

Interiors, 781 P.2d 487 at 479 (Utah App. 1989).

Whether the

language of the stipulation and decree is ambiguous is a question
of law and should be reviewed for correctness.

Equitable Life

and Casualty Insurance Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187 at 1192 (Utah
App.) cert,

denied.

860 P.2d 943 (Utah, 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDING.
The Defendant appeals the Order of the Third Judicial

District Court entered May 2, 1995, which, in effect, denies the
Defendant's Motion to Compel the refund of tax payments made to
the Plaintiff pursuant to the Decree of Divorce.

However, an

Order of identical content referring to the Defendant's same
Motion was entered February 3, 1995 and not appealed from.
Additionally, an earlier "Recommendation and Order" which denies
the Defendant's Motion to Compel Reimbursement was entered by the
court on December 27, 1994, and not appealed.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
1.

On August 17, 1992, the parties entered into an oral

stipulation, read on the record, before the trial court, to
settle the remaining issues of their bifurcated divorce. [R. 610
- 616]
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2.

The stipulation was read on the record by the

Defendant's attorney. [R. 610]
3.

The oral stipulation provided, in part, as follows:
. . . Mrs. Fairbanks will provide her tax
return to Mr. Fairbanks and he can elect to,
within 15 days thereafter, to provide tax
returns prepared at his expense. He could
then purchase any of the tax exemptions for
the parties' minor children by paying the
difference between her tax liability by not
claiming those particular exemptions. He
must pay that amount to her by April 10th of
that year. [R. 615 - 616]

4.

Based upon the oral stipulation the Defendant's

attorney prepared a "Supplemental Decree of Divorce" entered by
the court January 19, 1992. [R. 308 - 317]
5.

The "Supplemental Decree of Divorce" provides as

follows:
16. The Defendant is awarded the right to
purchase the tax exemptions for the parties'
minor children from Plaintiff. Defendant may
exercise this right by paying to Plaintiff
any difference in her tax liability resulting
from Defendant purchasing the right to claim
said tax exemptions.
6.

The Plaintiff was awarded alimony which was to

terminate upon her remarriage.

(Supplemental Decree of Divorce,

f2, at R. 2)
7.

The parties had four children born as issue of the

marriage and child support entered in the total base award amount
of $1,187. {R. 2 and R. 309]
8.

The child support calculation included the imputation

of income to the Plaintiff of $731 per month. [R. 431]
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9.

The Findings of Fact are silent as to the relevant

incomes of the parties.
10.

The Defendant claimed the exemption for the tax year

1992 [R. 379] and acknowledged that, due to the Plaintiff's
remarriage, that would be the last year that he would likely
claim those exemptions pursuant to the Decree. [R. 37 9]
11.

The Plaintiff remarried February 18, 1993. [R. 359] The

Defendant remarried May 17, 1994. [R. 384] The Plaintiff filed a
married-joint tax return for the tax year 1993 which reflected
earned income by the Plaintiff and her spouse. [R. 380]
12.

The Defendant paid the Plaintiff $3,044.49 pursuant to

the Decree and claimed the minor children of the parties as
exemptions for tax return purposes. [R. 360] Subseguently, the
Defendant brought a Motion "to Compel Plaintiff to refund payment
demanded for execution of release of tax exemptions." [R. 363]
13.

Following the hearing before the Commissioner, the

matter was heard based upon the Plaintiff's objection by the
trial judge which resulted in a denial of the Defendant's Motion
to compel the refund. [R. 618 - 621]
14.

The court's "Recommendation and Order" dealing with the

issue of tax exemptions and other matters was signed and entered
December 27, 1994 after being served upon the Defendant by mail
October 27, 1994. [R. 476 - 481]
15.

That Order provides, in part, as follows:
13. The Defendant's Motion to Compel
Reimbursement of Sums paid to the Plaintiff
represents reimbursement to the Plaintiff for
her tax liability from not claiming the
-4-

parties' minor children as her dependents for
tax purposes is denied consistent with the
court's ruling based upon the Plaintiff's
objection to the Commissioner's
recommendation. [R. 479]
16.

In addition, based upon the trial court's ruling, the

Plaintiff's counsel prepared an Order which included the court's
findings and conclusions.
Defendant.

That Order was objected to by the

At a hearing dated January 9, 1995, the court

directed Plaintiff's counsel to submit a new Order which deleted
references to the findings and conclusions of the court, which
were to be established by way of a transcript of the ruling.
That Order was prepared by Plaintiff's counsel, served upon the
Defendant by mail, [R. 562] and entered by the court February 3,
1995. [R. 560 - 561]

No appeal was taken from that Order or the

previous Order, dated December 27, 1995.
17.

Subseguently, a third Order was signed and entered by

the court identical in every respect to the Order of February 3,
1995 except for the signature of the Defendant approving that
Order as to form.

That Order was also served upon the Defendant

on January 9, 1995.

[R. 599 - 601]

18.

The Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on June 1, 1995.

19.

the Plaintiff disputes the factual allegations

contained in the Appellant's principal brief which are not
substantiated by the record including any reference to tax years
subsequent to 199 3 which were not part of the court's Order, or
the Defendant's Motion and have no basis in the record.

-5-

20.

In denying the Defendant's Motion to Compel

Reimbursement, the trial judge noted:
(a)

That the child support guidelines for the State of

Utah changed as of July, 1994, and the previous guidelines
presumed that the custodial parent would enjoy the right to
claim the minor child as exemptions (resulting in a
reduction of support paid to the custodial parent). [R. 619]
(b)

That once remarried, the Plaintiff has the

alternative of filing a joint or separate-married return and
that her tax liability is based upon her filing status and
her liability is joint and several under joint return. [R.
620]
(c)

That to sustain the Defendant's Motion would

require that the court entertain "hypothetical calculations"
and would ignore the economic reality of the parties'
circumstances.
(d)

Based upon that the court concluded that the

Decree of Divorce contemplated the calculation of tax
liability based upon the actual tax return filed by the
Plaintiff and, therefore, the Defendant's Motion should be
denied.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant's Notice of Appeal was not timely filed.

The

content of the Order appealed from is identical in every respect
to the court's earlier Order dated February 3, 1995, except the
May 2, 1995 Order was approved by the Defendant as to form.
-6-

The

February 3rd Order was properly served upon the Defendant and
submitted to the court pursuant to the Code of Judicial
Administration.1

The mere fact that the Defendant approved that

same Order as to form, and apparently submitted the same to the
court and it is entered does not extend the time to appeal,
especially where the provisions of the two Orders are identical.
The Defendant's June 1, 1995 Notice of Appeal is more than thirty
(30) days after the February 3, 1995 Order.
The court was correct in interpreting the Decree of Divorce.
The Plaintiff's tax liability is the tax liability she has under
the tax return she files as a married spouse.

In this case, the

Plaintiff filed a joint tax return with her husband.

She is,

thereby, jointly and severally liable for the tax obligation of
that return.

The parties obviously contemplated that they each

would remarry.

Both parties have remarried.

By virtue of that

fact, the Plaintiff no longer is entitled to receive alimony.
There is no language altering the Defendant's right to claim the
children as tax exemptions upon Plaintiff's remarriage.

At best,

the Defendant could claim rights to modify the Decree of Divorce
by virtue of the Plaintiff's remarriage if he is claiming that it
was an unanticipated substantial change.

However, otherwise, it

would be an anticipated event which was not included as any sort
of a limiting factor in the Decree as it provides to tax
exemptions.
1

The January 9th Order was mailed to the Defendant along
with a cover letter explaining that the Defendant had five (5)
days to object and that the Order was served pursuant to the
Rules of Judicial Administration. That letter does not appear of
record in this case, but, as a convenience, is included in the
Addendum.
-7-

The Plaintiff's new spouse is obligated to support his step
children, and he does, pursuant to §78-45-4.1.

Additionally,

"support received from a parent's spouse upon remarriage is
treated as having been received from the parent." (I.R.C.
§152(e)(5))
The child support that the Plaintiff receives in this case
is still governed by the pre-1994 guidelines.

Those guidelines

included a reduced amount of child support based upon the
assumption that the custodial parent would enjoy the right to
claim the minor child as exemptions.

The law which took place in

1994 (which does not govern the Decree in this case) changes that
Rule.
Previous court decisions in this state required that the
parties and the court look to the "economic realities of any
particular set of circumstances."

In this case, the economic

realities include the Plaintiff's filing of a married-joint tax
return.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS FILED
UNTIMELY AND THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO
CONSIDER THE APPEAL.
Where a Notice of Appeal is not timely filed the court is
without jurisdiction to consider the appeal and the appeal should
be dismissed.
1991).

Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 817 P.2d 320 (Utah

In this case, the first Order which denied the

Defendant's Motion to Compel Reimbursement was entered December
-8-

27, 1994. That Order was served pursuant to the Code of Judicial
Administration on the Defendant October 27, 1994. No appeal was
taken.

The second Order which was likewise served upon the

Defendant pursuant to the Code of Judicial Administration was
entered February 3, 1995. No appeal was taken.

The third Order

which was entered May 2, 1995, is identical to the February 3,
1995 Order except that the May 2nd Order has been approved as to
form by the Defendant.

It is a duplicate Order at best and does

not affect the parties7 rights under the Decree.
The confusion, if any, arises for the following reasons.
The initial Order prepared by the Plaintiff's attorney included
the court's findings and conclusions as well as the court's
ruling.

This Order was objected to and, after a hearing on

January 9th, Plaintiff's counsel was instructed to prepare
another Order which simply referred to the court's ruling.

The

court's findings would be established by the transcript of the
ruling which the Defendant was reguired to obtain.

On the same

day as the court's decision directing the entry of the court's
Order and the transcription of the ruling (of the October 24,
1994 hearing), Plaintiff's counsel prepared the new Order and
served it on the Defendant pursuant to the Code of Judicial
Administration.

It was served upon the Defendant together with a

transmitting cover letter which reminded the Defendant that he
had five days to object and that the Order would be submitted
pursuant to the Code of Judicial Administration.
objection.

There was no

The Order was submitted together with a certificate
-9-

of mailing.

Because the Defendant had the original Order calling

for his approval as to form, another Order was printed by
Plaintiff's counsel and submitted to the court for entry.
Apparently, sometime thereafter, the Defendant approved the
January 9th Order as to form and submitted it to the court and it
was entered on May 2, 1995.
Even disregarding the court7s Order of December 27, 1994,
the February 3, 1995 Order certainly should control the
disposition of the Defendant's Motion.

The June 1, 1995 Notice

of Appeal is untimely and there was no effort to extend the time
to file the Notice of Appeal.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO DENY THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL REIMBURSEMENT
SHOULD BE SUSTAINED BECAUSE IT IS CONSISTENT
WITH THE ECONOMIC REALITIES OF THE PARTIES'
CIRCUMSTANCES.
The issue on appeal is not which party should receive the
right to claim the tax exemptions associated with their minor
children.

Rather, the parties agreed that the Plaintiff would

have that right unless the Defendant determined that the
exemptions were of more "value" to him than to the Plaintiff.
The underlying consideration in this agreement was the relative
tax benefit to one party or the other and who would save the most
in actual taxes paid.

This is largely a function of which tax

"bracket" or effective date the parties experience.

If the

parties experience the same federal tax bracket, then presumably,
the Defendant would not exercise his right because his payment
-10-

would be the same amount that he would save in taxes and there
would be no benefit to him.

Therefore, the underlying

consideration of the parties' stipulation was to avoid the
unnecessary payment of taxes.

As will be seen hereafter, if the

Defendant's interpretation of the Stipulation and Decree is
adopted, it will mean the unnecessary payment of additional taxes
(when the parties' tax returns are viewed together) and the
assumption that the Plaintiff is filing her tax return under a
status other than the status she actually utilizes.

In every

sense of the term, the Defendant's argument ignores the "economic
realities" of the parties.
Amended Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.), §152(e) specifies
that the custodial parent is entitled to the dependency exemption
absent a waiver.

Since that amendment a majority of the state

court's considering the issue have ruled that the courts retain
jurisdiction to allocate dependency exemptions to non-custodial
parents.

Serrano v. Serrano, 566 A.2d 413 (Conn. 1989); Motes v.

Motes, 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989).
The primary issue addressed in Motes was
whether a state divorce court has the
authority to award a tax exemption for
supported children to the non-custodial
parent. Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974 (Utah
App. 1992) (concurring opinion).
In Motes the court held:
State divorce courts must always recognize
the financial benefit accompanying dependency
exemptions when awarding alimony and child
support. Thus, use of the power to order a
custodial parent to execute a §152
Declaration should not be used to evenly
other otherwise divide the available
exemptions without regard to the particular
economic realities. Motes v. Motesf supra.
-11-

Allred v. Allredr supra, is in agreement with the Motes
decision:
First, the tax exemptions should not be
awarded to the non-custodial parent without
regard to the economic realities' to the
particular case. . . In my view, this is the
lesson of Motes: The award of the tax
exemption for dependents should be based on
economic realities and should be supported by
adequate findings. Allred v. Allred, supra,
(concurring opinion).
In this case the following "economic realities" are not
disputed:
1.

The Plaintiff has remarried and commenced filing a

married-joint federal tax return in 1993.2
2.

The Plaintiff has determined that it is to her

benefit, to reduce the lawful taxes which are due by filing
a married-joint tax return.
3.

The parties' children are supported by way of

support provided by the Plaintiff and her husband as well as
child support paid by the Defendant.
4.

The Plaintiff's husband has a statutory duty under

§78-45-4.1, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) to support a
step child to the same extent that a natural or adoptive
parent is required to support a child.
5.

Under I.R.C. §6013(d)3), if a couple files a joint

return, each spouse becomes jointly and severally liable for

2

The Defendant suggests that the allocation of dependency
exemptions should be based upon "who provides the greater
support". In addition to the fact that that is not the issue
before the court on this appeal, there was no evidence introduced
upon which the court could base a finding of who provides the
greater support, at least when the step-parent's support is
included in that comparison.
-12-

the full amount of tax due on the couple's combined
earnings.

(Furthermore, both spouses are also liable for

assessments and penalties due to unreported income,
disallowed deductions and the like.) I.R.C. §6653(b)(3)
6.

The rules for allocating dependency exemptions

between divorced or separated parents are provided by the
Internal Revenue Code § 152(e).

For purposes of determining

which parent provides more than one-half of the cost to
support a child, support received from a parent's spouse
upon remarriage is treated as having been received from the
parent.

I.R.C. §152(e)(5).

No finding can be made as to which party would benefit the
most by claiming the exemptions because the Defendant has never
indicated the extent of his 1993 income.

However, the Defendant

did pay the Plaintiff for the increased amount of tax due under
her married-joint tax return filing.

This is in spite of the

fact that the Plaintiff's spouse earns "in excess of $75,000 per
year." (Brief of Appellant on appeal, p. 12) If that is the case,
then the parties' stipulation accomplished exactly what was
intended: the overall reduction of taxes when the parties' tax
returns and overall liability are taken together.

The only

difference is that the Defendant does not want to pay for the
Plaintiff's tax liability under the economic realties of this
case which include the fact that the Plaintiff files a marriedjoint return.
If the Defendant's income tax bracket (including the income
of his new spouse) is lower than the Plaintiff's under her
married-joint filing then, presumably, the Defendant will not
-13-

wish to "purchase" the exemptions.

In that event, the parties7

stipulation accomplishes the same and legitimate goal that the
parties had when they reached their stipulation: the overall
reduction in combined and legitimate taxes due.
The Court can also discern the intent of the parties when
viewing the stipulation as a whole.

In doing so, it should be

noted that the Defendant's counsel read the stipulation for the
record and prepared the Supplemental Decree of Divorce which
responds, essentially, with the stipulation.

The stipulation and

the Decree provide that in order for the Defendant to claim the
children as exemptions, he must pay "to Plaintiff any difference
in her tax liability resulting from Defendant purchasing the
right to claim said tax exemptions."

(Decree of Divorce, fl6)

The Defendant urges an interpretation which would require
the addition of terms to the parties' agreement.

This new term

would state that for purposes of calculating the Plaintiff's tax
liability, the parties would pretend that the Plaintiff was were
filing a married-separate return. Aside from ignoring the
"economic realities" of the Plaintiff's circumstances, the Decree
and the stipulation simply does not provide for that method of
calculating the Plaintiff's tax liability.
Obviously, the parties could have agreed to terms which are
now urged by the Defendant.

The parties agreed for the

termination of alimony upon the Plaintiff's remarriage.

The

parties contemplated that the Plaintiff would remarry at some
point.

Nevertheless, the stipulation and the Decree do not alter

the method of calculating "her tax liability" in the event of
remarriage.

The rules governing the construction of contracts,
-14-

which the Defendant urges this Court to apply to the
interpretation of the Decree in this case, would require that the
trial court decision be sustained.
The parties7 agreement and the Decree of Divorce is
consistent with the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and
the laws of the State of Utah.

Utah statute imposes upon a step

parent the liability to support step children.

The I.R.C.

acknowledges and economic reality that a step parent will often
provide support for step children.

In such a case, the support

received from a step parent is treated as having been received
from the natural parent for purposes of allocating the dependency
exemptions between divorced spouses.
In a broader sense, the I.R.C, Utah Code Ann., and the
Decree of Divorce acknowledge another very fundamental economic
reality.

Upon remarriage, the parties frequently if not

typically commingle their wherewithal for the support of the
family.

Under those circumstances, it is equitable and

reasonable to view the value of a dependency exemption in the
same way that family finances and taxes are viewed: together.
The Defendant has also failed to marshall the evidence in
support of the court's decision.

The Plaintiff testified by way

of her affidavit that after the transfer of dependency exemptions
for the tax year 1992, and when the Defendant learned of the

-15-

Plaintiff's remarriage plans, he indicated that he would not be
"purchasing" the exemptions in the future because the Plaintiff
would be filing a joint return and it would not be economical for
the Defendant to purchase the exemptions in that event.

That

Affidavit is unrebutted on the record, as such, it is clear
evidence in support of the Plaintiff's interpretation of the
terms of the Stipulation and the Decree.
CONCLUSION
The Notice of Appeal is not timely and the court lacks
jurisdiction to consider this matter.

The court properly

construed the stipulation and decree.

The Plaintiff's tax

liability should be based upon the "economic realities" in this
case.

One of those realities is that the Plaintiff files a

married - joint return.
with that reality.

Her tax liability should be consistent

The Plaintiff was awarded attorney's fees in

the divorce action and should be awarded fees for this appeal.
DATED THIS

/%* ^ day of January, 1996.
GREEN & BERRY

FREDERICK N. GREEN
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Frederick N. Green, certify that on the

/*?/A- day of

January, 1996, I served a copy of the attached Brief of Appellee
upon Roger R. Fairbanks, Appellant Pro Se, in this matter by
mailing a copy by first class mail with sufficient postage
prepaid to the following address: 8543 South Nutwood Circle,
Sandy, Utah 89094.
IEDERICK N. GREEN
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
and Cross-Appellant
G-189-90\Brief.1
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ADDENDUM
A.

Recommendation and Order, dated October 27, 1994.

B.

Minute Entry, dated January 9, 19 95

C.

Order, dated February 3, 19 95.

D.

Order, dated May 2, 1995.

E.

Letter of Rick Green to Roger Fairbanks, dated January 9,
1995.

F.

Supplemental Decree of Divorce, dated January 19, 1992.

G.

Transcript of Ruling of Judge Murphy from hearing dated
August 17, 1992
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APPENPUM "A
COPY OF RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
DATED OCTOBER 27, 1994

RISE SSXT^-CT GfHJBT
Thue Jiio-o.ai district

GREEN & BERRY
FREDERICK N. GREEN (1240)
SUSAN C. BRADFORD (5377)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5650

DEC 2 7 1994
S * L f LAi<LCOU>jfY

3y-

S^^^OLL.

Utifiuty Cieik

IN THE DISTRICT- COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JILL FAIRBANKS,
RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil NO.

ROGER R. FAIRBANKS,

914902005DA

Judge Michael R. Murphy

Defendant.
\,^

' ^

.

The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for
hearing before the Honorable Commissioner Michael S. Evans on the
13th day of July, 1994, the Plaintiff and the Defendant appearing
in person and the Plaintiff being represented by her attorney of
record, and the Defendant representing himself, the Court having
entertained the motions of the parties, as well as the evidence
and argument of the parties, and good cause otherwise appearing,
it is, hereby,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows:

1.

That each party alleges the other party has engaged in

inappropriate behavior during the times that the children were
exchanged for visitation and, given the ages of the children, an
order of "curb side" visitation appears to be in the children's
best interests.

2.

That the parties dispute whether Defendant has

substantially complied with the court's order of visitation in
accordance with the standard schedule, which identifies a Friday
6:00 p.m. starting date for visitation periods.

It appears to be

in the children's best interests that Defendant arrive no later
than 7:00 p.m. on the date set for visitation and, in the event
he should fail to do so, that Plaintiff be free to make other
arrangements for the children.
3.

The Decree of Divorce specifically provides, in

paragraph 4, Defendant's obligation to obtain life insurance,
which life insurance Defendant has failed to obtain simply
alleging that he cannot afford to so do.
4.

That it appears that Defendant was provided with

Plaintiff's request for reimbursement regarding the children's
medical bills, if not earlier then by way of pleadings submitted
in support of Plaintiff's present motion, and it is reasonable
that judgment be entered against Defendant in the amount of
$755.00 as prayed.
5.

That the parties disagree with the interpretation of

the Decree of Divorce as it relates to the award of attorney's
fees to Plaintiff.

The Decree of Divorce in paragraph 15 orders

Defendant to pay to Plaintiff the sum of $3,000 as a contribution
to Plaintiff's attorney's fees and sets forth a payment schedule.
The final sentence of paragraph 15, which is the disputed
language provides, "In the event the Defendant becomes more than
thirty days delinquent in payment of said obligation for
-2-

attorney's fees and costs, then Plaintiff shall be entitled to
obtain a judgment against Defendant for the unpaid balance owing
. . ."

Plaintiff argues that any thirty day delinquency in any

of the payments pursuant to schedule allows her to seek a
judgment for any unpaid balance of the original $3,000 award,
while Defendant argues that only those payments which were due
according to the schedule of payments may be reduced to judgment.
The Commissioner finds that the Decree is appropriately
interpreted to require that any unpaid balance owing of the
$3,000 attorney's fees awarded at the time of a thirty day
delinquency, which has in fact occurred, is the appropriate
interpretation of the Decree.
6.

That the parties shall be restrained from having any

contact with one another or in any way coming about the person or
premises of one another or harassing each other during times the
children are exchanged for periods of visitation and the
Defendant shall arrive at Plaintiff's home at the appointed time,
in no event later than 7:00 p.m. when the visitation is to
commence at 6:00 p.m., and remain in his vehicle while the
Plaintiff sends the children out, with the process to be repeated
at the end of any visitation period.
7.

In the event that the Defendant arrives more than one

hour past the scheduled time for visitation, the Plaintiff shall
be free to make other arrangements for the children.

-3-

8.

The issue of the Defendant's contempt for failure to

obtain life insurance as ordered by the Decree is certified for
further hearing before the above-entitled Court.
9.

The Defendant may purge himself of any finding of

contempt in this regard by forthwith obtaining life insurance
consistent with the Decree.
10.

The Plaintiff shall be awarded judgment against the

Defendant in the amount of $7 55 representing one-half of the
children's uninsured medical expenses and the issue of the
Defendant's contempt in this regard is reserved pending his
future performance.
11.

That the Defendant is admonished to abide by the terms

of the Decree of Divorce in promptly making all payments of child
support on the date due.

The issue of the Defendant's contempt

in this regard is reserved pending his future performance.
12.

That the Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the

Defendant in the amount of $3,000 together with the judgment rate
of interest, representing attorney's fees due and owing but
unpaid pursuant to the Decree of Divorce.
13.

That the Defendant's Motion to Compel reimbursement of

sums paid to the Plaintiff representing reimbursement to the
Plaintiff for her tax liability from not claiming the parties
minor children as her dependents for tax purposes is denied
consistent with the Court's ruling based upon the Plaintiff's
Objection to the Commissioner's recommendation.

-4-

^AV^J/>
14.

That each party shall bear and pay their own attorneys

fees and costs for this matter.
DATED THIS

^ n\

day of

w± ^_

1994,

BY THE COURT:

10N0RABLE MICHAEL
DISTRICT COURT .JUDGE
DATED THIS

^1

day of U;A^„

V^A

1994.

BY THE COURT:
-^

COMMISSIONER MICHAEL S. EVANS
DISTRICT COURT COMMISSIONER

-5-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss
)

Audree D. Askee, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY,
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served the attached
RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER upon the following parties by placing a
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Roger R. Fairbanks, Esq.
Defendant Pro Se
8543 South 890 East
Sandy, Utah 84 094
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the
27th day of October, 1994.

\

-*—4=*-

** _c

-2L.H^T_(-

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 27th day of October,
1994.

p-J w»» ME* mm an» aon • = • era M B M warnranwxn ram em c r j

' V S ? 3 ! ^
, A^AmrJ
v x
^ • TPfOhj
5
Or>V

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah

8615 SoutM 185 E^t
fj
Sandy, Utah 8400.
I
My Commission Eyp'rcs n
May 19.1993
R

F-169-90\RecOrder.Pld
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ADDENDUM "B
COPY OF MINUTE ENTRY
DATED JANUARY 9, 1995

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
FAIRBANKS, JILL
PLAINTIFF
VS
FAIRBANKS, ROGER R

CASE NUMBER 914902005 DA
DATE 01/09/95
HONORABLE MICHAEL R MURPHY
COURT REPORTER KATHY MORGAN
COURT CLERK MGS

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:

HEARING

P. ATTY. GREEN, FREDERICK N
D. ATTY. FAIRBANKS, ROGER R

THIS BEING THE TIME SET FOR HEARING ON THE OBJECTIONS TO
PROPOSED ORDER.
THERE BEING AN ERROR IN THE MINUTE ENTRY DATED 10/24/94, THE
COURT NOW CLARIFIES THE ORDER, THE OBJECTIONS ARE SUSTAINED FOR
REASONS SET FORTH ON THE RECORD ON THE HEARING DATED 10/24/94.
MR GREEN WILL SUBMIT THE NEW ORDER. MR FAIRBANKS IS TO ORDER
THE TRANSCRIPT FOR THE HEARING ON 10/24/94 OF THE RULING FOR
FILING.

C0 0512

ADDENDUM "C
COPY OF ORDER
DATED FEBRUARY 3, 1995

GREEN & BERRY
FREDERICK N. GREEN (1240)
SUSAN C. BRADFORD (5377)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5650

f lS.£B H5-STPIST 0OBRT
i ' " " Jiioicta! District

^8

3 1995

SAL, L^Kb COUNTY

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JILL FAIRBANKS,
O R D E R

Plaintiff,
Civil NO.

vs.
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS,

914902005DA

Judge Michael R. Murphy

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on
the 24th day of October, 1994, before the Honorable Judge Michael
R. Murphy, Presiding, based upon the Plaintiff's Objection to
Commissioner's Recommendation, the Plaintiff appearing in person
and through her attorney of record, and the Defendant appearing
in person and as his own attorney, the matter having been
submitted to the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 and Rule 6-401 of
the Code of Judicia] Administration, and the Court having granted
oral argument and considered the evidence and argument of the
parties, and good cause otherwise appearing, it is, hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows:
1.

That the Plaintiff's objection to the Commissioner's

recommendation is, and is hereby, sustained.
2.

That the Defendant's Motion to Compel is denied.

3.

That in all other respects the Commissioner's

recommendation is affirmed insofar as no other portions thereof
have been objected to.
4.

That the basis for this Order was articulated by the

Court at the time of the ruling.

The Defendant shall, as soon a

possible, obtain a transcript of the ruling at the Defendant's
expense which shall be made a part of this record and
incorporated herein by this reference.
DATED THIS

^

day of

, T/

, 1995.

BY THE C0lIMJ^5rk"\

HONORABLE MICHAEL 'R^pftPHY
DISTRICT COURT JV&gft^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss
)

Audree D. Askee, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY,
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served the attached
ORDER upon the following parties by placing a true and correct
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Roger R. Fairbanks, Esq.
Defendant Pro Se
261 East 300 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the
9th, day of January, 1995.

~L

'•—'J

J L J - —

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of January,
1995.

YiH \( ki

y\

Notary Public (
Residing in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah
My Commission Expires]:

F-169-90\Order.P12

-3-

^4+-

ADDENDUM "D
COPY OF ORDER
DATED MAY 2, 1995

GREEN & BERRY
FREDERICK N. GREEN (1240)
SUSAN C. BRADFORD (53 77)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5650

FILED BfSTRJCTCOVRT
Third Judicial District

MAY

2 1995

SALT LAKE QGUNTY
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JILL FAIRBANKS,
O R D E R

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.

ROGER R. FAIRBANKS,

914902005DA

Judge Michael R. Murphy

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on
the 24th day of October, 1994, before the Honorable Judge Michael
R. Murphy, Presiding, based upon the Plaintiff's Objection to
Commissioner's Recommendation, the Plaintiff appearing in person
and through her attorney of record, and the Defendant appearing
in person and as his own attorney, the matter having been
submitted to the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 and Rule 6-401 of
the Code of Judicial Administration, and the Court having granted
oral argument and considered the evidence and argument of the
parties, and good cause otherwise appearing, it is, hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows:
1.

That the Plaintiff's objection to the Commissioner's

recommendation is, and is hereby, sustained.
2.

That the Defendant's Motion to Compel is denied.

3.

That in all other respects the Commissioner's

recommendation is affirmed insofar as no other portions thereof
have been objected to.
4.

That the basis for this Order was articulated by the

Court at the time of the ruling.

The Defendant shall, as soon as

possible, obtain a transcript of the ruling at the Defendant's
expense which shall be made a part of this record and
incorporated herein by this reference.
DATED THIS

^

day of

\\ \ (\,W
BY THE COURT:

7 <

—

->^1995.
\

\

HONORABLE MICHAEL RV,MURPHY '
DISTRICT COURT ~JUDGlf
Approved as to Form:

/ ^ r A ^ / ^ - s 4/flfa*

ROGEBT R. FAIRBANKS, ESQ.
Defendant Pro Se

-2-

<\ (^ r* c

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss
)

Audree D. Askee, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY,
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served the attached
ORDER upon the following parties by placing a true and correct
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Roger R. Fairbanks, Esq.
Defendant Pro Se
261 East 300 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the
^

day of -ec^ofeer, 1995.

v yQ k o

.A vSUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

<^\

d a y of

fe
v^V'ca^

1995,

pnriCM

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah

W)-

My Commission Expires:
CGIb ^ v

sF-l62fe9t)\Order

^Kt2cf 0
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ADDENDUM "E"
COPY OF LETTER OF FREDERICK N. GREEN TO
ROGER FAIRBANKS

O I R E E N <& B E E R Y
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
622 N E W H O U S E B U I L D I N G
10 E X C H A N G E P L A C E
S A L T L A K E C I T Y . U T A H 841 1 1
T E L E P H O N E (801)363-5650
F A X (801)363-5658
FREDERICK! N G R E E N
R A Y M O N D SCOTT BERRY
JULIE V LUND
SUSAN C BRADFORD

Januarys 1995

Roger R. Fairbanks
261 East 300 South, #300
Sale Lake City, Utah 84111
RE:

Fairbanks v. Fairbanks

Dear Roger:
Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration, please find the
enclosed Order. Please sign the Order and return it our office so that we may file it with the
court.
Notice of objection, if any, must be submitted to the court, and the undersigned,
within five (5) days of service.
Sincerely,
GREEN & BERRY

Kix)

Frederick N. Green
FNG/aa
Enclosure
cc:

Jill Eyring

r-169 90\rairbanlcRo4

ADDENDUM "F
COPY OF SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE
DATED JANUARY 19, 1992

PHILLIP W. DYER
(4315)
Attorney for Defendant
318 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
(801)
363-5000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JILL FAIRBANKS,
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF
DIVORCE

]
i

ROGER R. FAIRBANKS,

Civil No. 91-4902005 DA

Defendant.

Judge Michael Murphy

The above-entitled matter came on for an in-Court
conference before the Honorable Michael Murphy, District Court
Judge, on the

17th

day of

August , 1992, at the hour of

1:15 p.m., the plaintiff appearing in person with her counsel,
Frederick N. Green, the defendant appearing in person with his
counsel, Phillip W. Dyer.

The parties had previously

stipulated to a bifurcation of the proceedings such that the
marital relationship was terminated and all other issues were
reserved for trial.

Thereupon, the parties having advised the

Court that they had entered into a Stipulation resolving all
1

remaining issues, which Stipulation was read into the record
and acknowledged by the parties in open Court to be his/her
voluntary agreement.

The Court then approved the Stipulation,

the Court having made and entered its Supplemental Findings of
Fact and Supplemental Conclusions of Law, and good cause
appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, as

and for base child support, the sum of $1,387*00 per month,
less $200.00 per month as and for health insurance premiums,
for a total base child support award of $1,187.00 per month.
Said base chiid support shall be paid one-half (1/2) on the
5th of each month and one-half (1/2) on the 20th of each
month.

The defendant shall, forthwith, provide plaintiff with

evidence of his health insurance premium as set forth above.
2.

The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, as

and for alimony, the sum of $400.00 per month.

Said alimony

shall terminate upon tho occurrence of Lhe first of the
following events: plaintiff remarries, plaintiff dies,
plaintiff resides with an adult person of the opposite sex or
until further order of this Court.

Said alimony shall be paid

one-halt (1/2) on the r>th of each month and one-half (1/2) on
the 20tn of each month.

i . f

3.

The defendant is ordered to maintain in effect the

health insurance coverage through his employment for the
benefit of the parties' minor children.

The plaintiff may

purchase additional/substitute health insurance coverage for
the benefit of the parties' minor children if she so desires,
and the credit against base child support given to defendant
(in paragraph 1 hereinabove) shall abate upon plaintiff giving
defendant written notice of such substitution of insurance.
Further, in the event plaintiff purchases substitute health
insurance coverage, plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay,
and indemnify and hold defendant harmless thereon, all medical
expenses not covered by said substitute health insurance as
the result of pre-existing conditions which are not covered by
said substitute insurance, provided those expenses would have
been covered by the defendant's insurance.

Furthermore, the

parties are ordered to each pay one-half (1/2) of any other
medical, dental, orthodontic and optical expenses reasonably
and necessarily incurred for the benefir of the parties' minor
children, including deductible amounts which are not covered
by defendant's insurance or the substitute insurance and which
are not governed by the provision hereinabove concerning
substitute insurance and pre-existing conditions.

In the

event any of the parties' minor children reasonably and
3

necessarily requires orthodontia care, the plaintiff is
ordered to provide defendant with forty-five (45) days advance
notice of the orthodontic work to be performed so that
defendant can make appropriate financial arrangements with the
health care provider.
4.

The defendant is ordered to purchase, within three

(3) months after the entry of the Supplemental Decree herein,
and to pay the premiums thereon and maintain in effect during
the children's minorities, a life insurance policy with a
death benefit of $250,000^00, which names the parties' minor
children as the sole and irrevocable beneficiaries thereon.
Defendant shall have the discretion and authority to reduce
(pro rata) the death benefit, without further Court order, as
his child support obligation decreases upon each of the
parties' minor children attaining her age of majority.

The

defendant shall provide plaintiff with evidence o± the
insurance when procured,
5.

The defendant is ordered to cooperate in assisting

the plaintiff to obtain dental insurance under the provisions
of C.O.B.R.A., if possible.

Plaintiff shall pay all expenses

for said dental insurance including, but not limited to, the
purchase thereon.
6.

The personal property of the parties is awarded as
4
'••

.-;.-.)

1

i

the parties have already divided it, except that defendant is
ordered to deliver, forthwith, to the plaintiff the oak filing
cabinet currently in his possession and pick up and exchange
therefor the nightstand purchased by at Mervyn's by the
defendant which is currently in the possession of the
plaintiff.

Otherwise, the parties' personal property is

awarded to the party in possession of the same, free and clear
of any claim of the other party.
7.

The defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum

of $340.00, which represents medical bills paid by plaintiff
during the pendency of these proceedings.
8.

The plaintiff is awarded the sole care, custody and

control of the parties' minor children, to-wit: Keri
Fairbanks, born July 12, 1979; Amy Fairbanks, born September
5, 1981; Heidi Fairbanks, born January 8, 1983; and Holly
Fairbanks, born December 19, 1985. The defendant is awarded
reasonable rights of visitation with the parties' minor
children, in accordance with the standard visitation schedule
adopted by the Th.»rd Judicial District Court, a copy of which
is attached hpreto and incorporated herein by this reference.
The defendant is ordered to provide plaintiff with twenty-four
(24) hours advance notice of his intent to not exercise any
visitation.

Further, the defendant's base child support
5

obligation shall abate by fifty percent (50%) when he
exercises continuous visitation for twenty-five (25) of
thirty (30) days,
9.

The plaintiff is awarded, free and clear of any claim

of defendant, the parties' marital residence and real
property, subject to the requirement that she assume and pay,
and indemnify and hold defendant harmless thereon, the
outstanding mortgage obligation(s) on said marital residence
and real property.

The defendant shall execute a Quit-claim

Deed, forthwith, conveying his interest in the marital home to
the plaintiff.
10.

The defendant is awarded, free and clear of any

claim of plaintiff, his partnership interest in the law firm
of Christensen, Jensen & Powell.

The plaintiff is awarded,

free and clear of any claim of defendant, her stock in U-Rent.
11.

The defendant is ordered to assume and pay, and

indemnify and hold plaintiff harmless thereon, the Mastercard
debt, the Promissory Note to First Security Bank, any tax
liabilities resulting from said Promissory Note being
defaulted and any debts incurred oy defendant since the date
of the parties' separation.

The plaintiff is ordered to

assume and pay, and indemnify and hold defendant harmless
thereon, the debts for the Vanagon, for the bedroom set, the

6

debt to plaintiff's father for the marital residence and the
debt to Sears for the washer and dryer, and any debts incurred
by plaintiff since "the date of the parties' separation.
12.

With respect to each and every debt and obligation

of the parties set forth or described in this Supplemental
Decree of Divorce, the parties' agreement to assume and pay,
and indemnify the other, is in the nature of a support
obligation and is intended to be non-dischargeable in
bankruptcy.
13.

The plaintiff is deemed to have waived any claim for

child support and alimony arrearages accruing prior to August
of 1992 and defendant is deemed to have waived any claim for
equity in the marital residence arising out of payment of the
second mortgage.
14.

A qualified domestic relations order shall issue to

the Administrator of defendant's retirement plans such that
one-half (1/2) of all vested retirement benefits accruing up
until the signing of this Supplemental Decree of Divorce shall
be awarded to plaintiff pursuant to law.

Said Order shall

provide, however, that the sum of $9,335.48 shall be first
deducted from the total of all accounts before any division of
said retirement benefits occurs for the benefit of plaintiff.
15.

The defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum
7
«

r

of $3,000.00 as and for a contribution to plaintiff's
attorney's fees and costs incurred herein, as follows:

$50.00

per month for the iirst year after entry of the parties'
Amended Decree of Divorce;

$100.00 per month during the

second year after entry of the Amended Decree of Divorce; and,
commencing in the third year afrer entry of the Amended Decree
of Divorce, and continuing thereafter until said sum is paid
in full, $150.00 per month; provided, however, that in the
event defendant's obligation to pay alimony to plaintiff shall
terminate, then defendant is ordered to increase the monthly
payments listed hereinabove as follows;

$100.00 per month for

the first year after entry of the parties' Amended Decree of
Divorce;

$175.00 per month during the second year after entry

of the Amended Decree of Divorce; and, commencing o_n the third
year afrer entry of the Amended Decree of Divorce, and
continuing thereafter until said sum is paid in full, $250.00
per month.

The increase in monthly payments shall commence in

the respective year alimony terminates and shall not be
applied retroactively to increase the amount of any payments
already paid to plaintiff.

The plaintiff is awarded interest

on the unpaid balance of said attorney's fees at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) but shall not be entitled to seek a
judgment against the defendant for said attorney's fees and
8

costs unless defendant becomes thirty (30) days delinquent in
the monthly payments set forth hereinabove.

In the event

defendant becomes more than thirty (30) days delinquent in
payment of said obligation for attorney's fees and costs, then
plaintiff shall be entitled to obtain a judgment against
defendant for the unpaid balance owing, without further
hearing, by giving defendant, written notice of default.
16.

The defendant is awarded the right to purchase the

tax exemptions for the parties' minor children from plaintiff.
Defendant may exercise this right by paying to plaintiff any
difference in her tax liability resulting from defendant
purchasing the riglrc to claim said tax exemptions.

In order

to implement this provision, the parties are ordered as
follows:

Each party shall exchange W-2 forms for the previous

tax year no later than the end of February of the following
year.

Plaintiff 13 ordered to prepare her tax return and

provide defendant with a copy by the end of February as
required for the W-2 exchange herein.

Defendant shall then

have fifteen (15) days in which to elect to purchase any or
all of the tax exemptions for the parties' minor children.
Defendant is ordered to notify plaintiff by March 15th of his
intent to purchase any of said exemptions and shall pay the
expense plaintiff incurs to have her tax return recalculated
9

as the result of defendant's election to purchase any or all
of said exemptions.

Plaintiff is ordered to execute all

necessary forms/documents so as to implement the provisions of
this paragraph.

Further, defendant is ordered to pay

plaintiff the sums owing to plaintiff as the result of his
purchase of any or all tax exemptions no later than April
10th of each year.
17.

The parties are awarded, equally, the 1991 income

tax refund after deducting $300.00 as payment toward the
second mortgage.

Defendant is therefore ordered to pay to the

Plaintiff the sum of $271.50 as and for her one-half (1/2) of
said income tax refund.
18.

All provisions in the prior Order Bifurcating

Proceedings shall remain in Jull force and effect, except as
modified herein.
19.

This Decree of Divorce shall be effective, and

entered, as of the date of hearing of this matter, which was
August 17, 1992.
DATED this

H

day of

\4/vl

, 1992.

BY "THE COURT:

^ _

HONORABLE MICHAEL MURPHY
District Court Judge
10
~\ r

A

*'

form:

Green
Attorney for Plaintiff

Date

k/mi/Fairbanks.dec/DIVID
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH

)
)3S

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Kathleen J. Giilman being duly sworn, deposes and says:
That she served

SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE

upon

the following parties by placing a true and correct copy
thereof in an envelope addressed to:
FREDERICK N. GREEN, ESQ.
GREEN & EEPRY
528 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mail at Scilt Lake City,
Utah, on the

/^

day oh^^%lAJL\M

« 1993-

IjMiAdj^u^
SUBSCRIBED AND SV70RN to before me this

My Commission Q^pi*ros4.
!

I

/*7

/ (Jay of

otary Public
-Jte&^ding at:
j Salt Lake County, Utah
DVcH

f i n c—.* aaa *vs ">r> r

Pti'.LUP
136 South M&-» ^>ti **et
Salt Lako City. Ut^ • 64101
My Commission Expires
February 14, 1936
State of Utah

J
.
•
I
-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH

)
jss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE. )
Kathleen J. Giliman, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
That she served
OF DIVORCE

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE

upon the following parties by placing a true

and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
FREDERICK N. GRFEN, ESQ.
GREEN & EERRY
528 Newhousa Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lako City, Utah 84111
and depositing the same,, sealed, with first class postage
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City,
Utah, on the J ^ Z L day ofK \p3{(.lll{^

0

, 1993.

6

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s

J^2*=r=^

•**?"

J*t)

/7da\
ay of

. 5.993.

My Commission expires :,-;

, Nat &ry —£y b 1 i c
-Residing, at:
;: v,, ""^ii^it Lake County, Utah

ADDENDUM "G

COPY OF TRANSCRIPT OF RULING OF JUDGE MURPHY
FROM HEARING DATED AUGUST 17, 1992

FUCnQlSTRICT COURT
1

}U? T

-

i

^-r,-tr- District

OCT 1 5 1992

By

-Deputy Clerk

ILL FAIRBANKS,
PLAINTIFF.
VS .

:IVIL NO. 914902005 DA

.OGER R. FAIRBANKS,
DEFENDANT.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
HEARING OF AUGUST 17, 199

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY
JUDGE Or THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
A P P E A R A i! C E 5
FOR THE PLAINTIFF

FREDERICK N. GREEN, ESQ.
ATTORNEY AT LAV?

622 NEWHOUSE BUILDING
10 EXCHANGE PLACE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 3 411:
FOR THE DEFENDANT:

REPORTED BY:

PHILLIP 17. DYER, ESQ.
ATTORNEY AT LAN
318 KEARNS BUILDING
L3 6 SOUTH MAIN STREET
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OF ME,

MR. FREDERICK GREEN IS HERE ON BEHALF OF MR.

FAIRBANKS.

M* . DYER HERE ON BEHALF OF MR. FAIRBANKS.

BOTH PARTIES ARE PRESENT.
AS I UNDERSTAND IT -- FIRST OF ALL, THIS MATTER
IS SET FOR TRIAL ON THURSDAY.
STIPULATION, I BELIEVE.

THE PARTIES HAVE REACHED A

IF THAT'S THE CASE, WOULD ONE OF

THE COUNSEL RECITE THAT STIPULATION.

MR. FAIRBANKS AND

MRS. FAIRBANKS, YOU NEED TO LISTEN CLOSELY, BECAUSE I
INTEND TO ASK YOU, AFTER IT'S RECITED ON THE RECORD,
WHETHER OR MOT THAT STIPULATION IS ACCEPTABLE TO'YOU.
MR. DYER:

MY NAME IS PHILLIP DYER. ANN I

REPRESENT THE DEFENDANT.
THE COURT WOULD

I ALSO HAVE A CASE NUMBER IF

—

THE COURT:
MR. DYER:
THE COURT:
MR. DYER:

GO AHEAD.
91490205.
THANK YOU.
YOUR HONOR, IN THIS MATTER THE

PARTIES HAVE AGREED THERE WILL BE AMENDED FINDINGS AND
DECREE TO PROVIDE AS FOLLOWS:

THE BASE CHILD SUPPORT

WILL BE AMENDED TO SI , 387 DOLLARS LESS A $200 CREDIT FOR
HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS PAID FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE
MINIR CHILDREN UPON SHOWING OF SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT THAT
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EXPENSE IS IN FACT BEING
j

THERE WILL BE ? ERUANENT ALIMONY I i! T HE SUM OF
$4 00 PER MONTH.

|

1T
T
THAT ALI ^0 "' np.VTQ; SLV wni'LD reRMINATE

UPON REMARRIAGE. DEATH, 0R RESIDING WITH A PER SON OF THE
OPPOSITE SEX 3Y THE PLAIN TIFF IN THIS PARTI CIJL AR MATTER.
IN ADDITION, TH OSE PAYMENTS WOLD BE MADE
ONE-HALF ON THE FIRST AND ONE-HALF ON THE 2 OTH . PURSUANT
TO STATUTE,

UNTIL SUCH T IME AS PLAINTIFF M RS. FAIRBANKS

DECIDES TO SUBSTITUTE OR CHANGE HEALTH INSU RAN CE. MR.
10

FAIRBANKS IS TO KEEP THE HEALTH INSURANCE I N E F17ECT HE

11

CURRENTLY HAS.

12

SHE WOULD HAVE THE FIGHT TO SUBST ITU TE THAT
INSURANCE AND IN THE EVEN T SHE DOES SO, SHE WO NLD PAY THE
PREMIUM AND THE S200 CREDIT WOULD BE DISCONTINUED AND THE
SI, 300 WOULD BE THE CORRE CT SUM.

16

SHE WOULD AGREE TO HOLD MR. FAIRB ANK S HARMLESS
FROM ANY INCREASED EXPENSES THAT RESULT FRO M H EP THE
SUBSTITUTING THAT HEALTH INSURANCE.

19

THE PARTIES HAV E AGREED THAT EACH PA RTY WOULD

20

PAY ONE-HAWF OFF ALL THE DENTAL OR ORTHODON m

Ml

NECESSARILY IN INCURRED,

-r .•-<

EXPENSES

ON ORTHODONTIC EX PEN SI'S, MRS.

FAIRBANKS WOULD PROVIDE 4 5 DAYS ADVANCE NOTICE TO MY
CLIENT SO THAT HE CAN MAK E PROPER ARRANGEMEUTl

WITH THE

HEALTH CARE PROVIDER.
WITH RESPECT TO LIFE INSURANCE. H

FAIRBANKS

061

HE yjOULD 3E REQUIRED TO OBTAIN THAT COVERAGE
WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF THE DECREE, AND WOULD USE HIS BEST
EFFORTS IN THAT REGARD.
MR. FAIRBANKS WOULD ALSO AGREE TO COOPERATE
WITH MRS. FAIRBANKS IN HELPING HER OBTAIN DENTAL
INSURANCE AT HER OWN EXPENSE THROUGH HIS LAW FIRM IF
THAT'S AVAILABLE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE COBRA.
PERSONAL PEOPERBY WOULD BE AS DIVIDED, EXCEPT
THAT THE PARTIES WOULD EXCHANGE THE OAK FILING CABINET IN
EXCHANGE FOR A NIGHT STAND THAT'S IN THE POSSESSION OF
MRS. FAIRBANKS.
MR. FAIRBANKS WOULD GIVE HER THE OAK FILING
CABINET.

ON THE OUTSTANDING MEDICAL BILLS. MR. FAIRBANKS

AGREES TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO PAY S340 IN OUTSTANDING
MEDICAL BILLS UPON RECEIPT OF STATEMENTS FROM MRS.
FAIRBANKS.
VISITATION RIGHTS, MR. FAIRBANKS WILL RECEIVE
STANDARD VISITATION RIGHTS THAT ARE STANDARD VISITATION
RIGHTS OF THIS COURT, AS WELL AS HE WOULD GIVE 2 4 HOURS
ADVANCE NOTICE OF INTENT NOT TO EXERCISE THAT VISITATION,
THE HOME EQUITY, THERE WOULD BE NO CLAIM AS THE

A

n <* r

AS TO THE DEBTS, MR. FAIRBANKS MILL PAY CM THE
MASTERCARD, AMY DEBTS AFTER SEPARATION, AS WELL A3 THE
PROMISSORY** MOTE TO FIRST SECURITY BANK IN THE SUM OF
£16,200.

HE WILL ALSO PAY ANY TAX LIABILITIES THAT

RESULT FROM THAT NOTE BEING DEFAULTED.
MRS. FAIRBANKS IS TO PAY THE VAMAGON, THE
BEDROOM SET TO HSR FATHER, FOR THE HOME, AND TO SEARS ON
THE WASHER AND DRYER, AS WELL AS ANY OTHER DEBTS THAT SHE
MIGHT HAVE INCURRED SINCE THE SEPARATION.
THE PARTIES AGREE TO ASSUME AND PAY THOSE DEBTS
AND HOLD THE OTHER HARMLESS, AND THEY AGREE TO
INDEMNIFICATION PROVISIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE CHILD
SUPPORT OBLIGATION, BOTH WAYS.
AS TO MR. FAIRBANKS' CLAIM FOR BENEFITS FROM
THE SECOND MORGAGE THAT WAS PAID OFF DURING THE PENDENCY
OF THESE PROCEEDINGS, HE WOULD WAIVE ANY CLAIM AS TO ANY
BENEFIT FROM THAT, IN CONSIDERATION OF MRS. FAIRBANKS
WAIVING THE CLAIM IN TERMS OF SUPPORT ARREARAGES, WHICH
IS A DISPUTED CLAIM.
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ADMINISTRATOR TO CALCULATE THE PARTIES' INTEREST, DEDUCT
THE SUM OF $3,349 FROM THE ACCOUNTS, THEN DIVIDING THE
BALANCE EQUALLY.
WITH RESPECT TO ATTORNEYS FEES, MR. FAIRBANKS
WOULD AGREE TO CONTRIBUATE TOWARD MRS. FAIRBANKS
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE SUM OF 33,000. PAYABLE AS FOLLOWS:
S50 PER MONTH FOR THE FIRST YEAR AFTER THE ENTRY OF
i DIVORCE, S100 PER MONTH THE SECOND YEAR, AND $150 PER
MONTH THE THIRD YEAR, PROVIDED, HOWEVER., THAT SHOULD
ALIMONY TERMINATE, THEN THAT WOULD BE REPECTIVELY
INCREASED BY THE SUMS OF S50, $75, AND S100 PER YEAR IN
EACH OF THOSE RESPECTIVE YEARS.
THAT SUM WOULD BEAR INTEREST OF 12 PERCENT, BUT
NO JUDGEMENT WOULD BE ENTERED UNLESS OR UNTIL! MR.
FAIRBANKS BECAME 30 DAYS DELINQUENT, AT WHICH TIME MRS.
FAIRBANKS WOULD BE ENTITLED TO JUDGEMENT WITHOUT A
HEARING, UPON GIVING WRITTEN NOTICE OF DEFAULT.
WITH RESPECT TO THE 1991 TAX REFUND, THE
PARTIES HAVE AGREED THAT THAT SUM WILL BE SPLIT, WITH MR.
FAIRBANKS ORDERED TO PAY THE SUM OF $27 0.50.
WITH RESPECT TO THE TAX EXEMPTIONS, THE PARTIES
HAVE AGREED THAT THEY WILL EACH EXCHANGE N-2 FORMS BY THE
END OF FEBRUARY OF EACH YEAR.

ADDITIONALLY. MRS.

FAIRBANKS WILL PROVIDE HER TAX RETURN TO MR. FAIRBANKS,
.AND HE CAN ELI'A? TO, WITHIN FIFTEEN DAYS THEREAFTER, TO
PROVIDE TAX RETURNS PREPARED AT HIS EXPENSE.

HE COULD

THEN PURCHASE ANY OF THE TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR THE PARTIES'
MINOR CHILDREN BY PAYING THE DIFFERENCE- 3ETWEEF KER TAX
LIABILITY" BY NOT CLAIMING THOSE PARTICULAR EXEMPTIONS.
HE MUST PAY THAT AMOUNT TO HER BY APRIL 10TH OF THAT
YEAR.
I BELIEVE I HAVE COVERED I: ALL.
10 I

THE COURT:

IS THAT C O R R F M

A MR. GREEN?

Ill

MR. GREEN:

I BELIEVE SO.

;OU? HONOR.

THE COURT:

MRS. FAIRBANKS, YOU HAVE HEARD THE

RESOLUTION AS RECITED BY MR. DYER.

IS THAT ACCEPTABLE TO

14 | YOU?
MRS. FAIRBANKS:
15 I

THE COURT:

17 I

MR. BA1RBANKS:
THE COURT:

19 |

YES,. IT : 5: .

MR. FAIRBANKS?
YES, IT IS,

WHO IS GOING TO PREPARE THE

PAPERS?
MR. DYER:
THE COURT:

I'LL PREPARE THEM, YOUR HONOR.
ALL RIGHT.

SEND THEM TO ME.

ADD

YOU WILL SIGN OFF ON THOSE, AND THEY'LL BE ENTERED.
MR. GREEN:

YES.

(WHEREUPON, THE PROCEEDINGS WERE COMPLETED)
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I,

GAYLS B .

AM A C E R T I F I E R
REPORTER

CAMPBELL,

DO HEREBY C E R T I F Y

SHORTHAND REPORTER

AND O F F I C I A L

IH AMD FOR THE THIRD J U D I C I A L

THAT AS SUCH I

HEREIN AND REPORTED THE SAME VERBATIM
THEREAFTER

IN

STATE

OF

TRANSCRIBE!

STENOTYPE ;

CAUSED THE SAME TO BE TRANSCRIBED

I

COURT

DISTRICT,

ATTENDED THE HEARING

THAT

AND

USING

COMPUTER-AIDED-TRANSCRIPTION.
THAT THE TRANSCRIPT

IS

TRUE

AND CORRECT TO THE

BEST OF MY A B I L I T Y .

SIGNED
7 - "IT

^TT'V

THIS

13TH D,\Y OF OCTOBER,

L9^

> -i"l .»_!

J.

TTT^lH

GAYLE 3 .

CAMPBELL.,

v ft i !

GREEN & BERRY
FREDERICK N. GREEN (124 0)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 361-5650
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JILL (FAIRBANKS) EYRING,

PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 914902005DA

ROGER R. FAIRBANKS,

Judge Michael R. Murphy

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss
)

Jill (Fairbanks) Eyring, being first duly sworn upon her
oath, deposes and states as follows:

1.

That she is the Plaintiff above-named and fully

competent to make and execute this Affidavit.
2.

That this Affidavit is submitted in opposition to the

Defendant's Motion and in support of the Plaintiff's Order to
Show Cause.
3.

That the parties were divorced by Decree of Divorce

which was supplemented on or about August 17, 1992, and provided
for, among other things, the following:
(a)

That each party exchange tax forms, including the

Plaintiff's tax return, after which the Defendant would have
15 days to elect to purchase any or all of the tax

exemptions by paying to the Plaintiff any difference in her
tax liability resulting from the Defendant's claiming of the
children as tax exemptions;
(b)

The Defendant was ordered to pay child support in

equal installments on the 5th and 2 0th of each month;
(c)

The parties were ordered to pay one-half each of

any medical, dental, orthodontic or optical expenses
reasonably and necessarily incurred for the benefit of the
minor children, including deductible amounts (except for
pre-existing conditions and in the event that the Plaintiff
purchased an alternative source of medical and health
insurance);
(d)

The Defendant was ordered to purchase within three

months of the entry of the supplemental Decree at $250,000
life insurance policy naming the minor children of the
parties as the sole and irrevocable beneficiaries thereon.
4.

That the Defendant was awarded standard visitation and

is required to give 24 hours notice of his intention not to
exercise any standard visitation.
5.

That the Defendant was ordered to pay attorney's fees

in installments and in the event of a thirty day delinquency for
judgment to enter together with interest.
6.

That the Defendant has never exchanged his W-2 form as

required by the Decree.
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7.

That after waiting for and demanding the Defendant's

W-2 form, the Plaintiff volunteered her W-2 form and tax returns
before April 10, 1994.
8.

That in 1993, when the Defendant exercised his right to

claim the exemptions relating to the children, the Defendant
stated that he was aware that this would be the only year he
would exercise that right because of the marriage of the
Plaintiff and her husband and the fact that they would be filing
a joint return which would save the Plaintiff and her husband
more than the Defendant.
9.

That in February, 1994, the Plaintiff attempted to

discuss the subject of taxes with the Defendant, but the
Defendant hung up on the Plaintiff.
10.

That based upon the earlier statements of the

Defendant, and the efforts of the Plaintiff to discuss the
subject of taxes, the Plaintiff concluded that the Defendant
would not be exercising any right to purchase the exemptions.
11.

In tne first week of April, 1994, the Defendant
t

contacted the Plaintiff's husband, asking for a copy of the
return, which //as not ready to be filed at that time, but which
was prepared and submitted to the Defendant.
12.

That during one of the conversations with the

Defendant, the Defendant stated, "I'm not going to buy them [the
exemptions], I am going to take them, and Jill better sign the
paper or I'll xzake her to court and see if she can afford to
fight against me because I can represent myself.11
-3-

13.

That by the time the Defendant prepared his letter

dated April 13, 1994, he had already received the information he
was demanding.
14.

That in fact, the Plaintiff was employed in 1993, and

her income is reflected on the tax return, which is a joint tax
return with her husband.
15.

That Plaintiff, as a joint tax return filer, will be

jointly liable for any taxes relating to the tax year 1993 which
are related to the 1993 tax return.
16.

That the Defendant is attempting to ignore the fact

that the Plaintiff files a joint tax return with her husband,
that the Plaintiff is equally responsible for any taxes under
that return, or future taxes, and that the Plaintiff's tax return
is in fact the joint tax return filed with her husband for the
tax year 1993.
17.

That the Defendant is habitually and continually late

in making his child support payments.

Of the last 42 child

support payments made since the entry of the Decree, only two
have been made on time.
18.

The Defendant's tardiness creates significant financial

problems and burdens for the Plaintiff and her children.
19.

The Defendant refuses to pay his portion of any medical

expenses related to the children.
20.

That in January, 1993, the Plaintiff was required to

make demands for medical bills through the Defendant's attorney.

-4-

21.

When the Plaintiff gives the Defendant the medical

bills, he tears them up on the Plaintiff's front lawn, and, by
way of foul and abusive language, informs her that he will not
pay the bills and the kids do not need to go to the dentist.
22.

That the following is a list of medical expenses, which

represents the Defendant's share thereof, all of which have been
delivered to the Defendant and all of which he has failed to pay.
Provider

Amount

Explanation

Shopko Optical $105.00

Keri's contact lenses and eye exam

Dr. Bladens

Dental

400.00

Dental

30.00

Children's Sears dental bill

Doctor visits

110.00

Children's visits to Dr. Stahl and
A s s o c , Dr. Meads and Dr. Stevens, Dr.
Rogers, Dr. Speakman and Holy Cross
Instacare

Prescriptions

$110.00

Twenty-two prescriptions at $5.00 each
and half of a $10.00 co-pay

TOTAL:

$755.00

23.

That the Plaintiff has frequently demanded that the

Plaintiff provide evidence of the life insurance specified in the
Decree.

At first, the Defendant stated that he forgot the

company name and finally Defendant stated, "I never really had a
policy and I don't plan on getting one."
a policy.
24.

And,

lf

I will never get

Take me to court and throw me in jail."
That the Defendant is usually tardy in the exercise of

his visitation.

The Defendant being late and absent not only

confuses the children, who prepare for his visits, but makes meal
preparation and the Plaintiff's other planning very difficult.
-5-
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25.

That the Defendant has never called to say that he

would not exercise visitation, and he has never called to say
that he would be late.
26.

That when the Defendant does exercise visitation, he is

verbally abusive, loud, and has come in the Plaintiff's home
without invitation or permission.
27.

That on one occasion the Defendant while exercising

visitation left the children in the care of their sister, Keri,
age 14, while he left to spend the night with his girlfriend, but
did not provide Keri with the address or phone number in the
event of an emergency.
Hi8.

That the Defendant has consistently refused to keep the

Plaintiff informed as to the children's whereabouts during
periods of visitation.
29.

That the Plaintiff has paid nothing towards attorney's

fees and the full sum, together with 12% interest, should enter
as judgment.
30.

That the Plaintiff has been required to retain counsel

to represent her in regards to the above-matters.
31.

That the Plaintiff requests the following relief of the

Court:
(a)

that the Defendant be held in contempt of court

for his willful and malicious violation of the Court's
Decree in regards to procuring life insurance, the payment
of medical bills, the timely payment of child support, and
the timely exercise of visitation (barring notice);
-6-

(b)

that judgment enter against the Defendant for

$3,000 together with 12% interest;
(c)

that all visitation be limited to "curb-side"

pick-up and drop-off;
(d)

that judgment enter for accrued and unpaid medical

bills in the amount of $755;
(e)

that any untimely child support payments be

assessed a $5.00 per day late fee;
(f)

that the Court order that in the event the

Defendant is late for the exercise of his visitation by more
than 3 0 minutes that the visitation be forfeited at the
option of the Plaintiff so that other plans and arrangements
may be made for the care of the children;
(g)

that the Plaintiff be awarded her attorney's fees

and costs associated with the Order to Show Cause.
DATED THIS

day of May, 1994.

JILL '(-FAIRBANKS) EYRjjNG
aTTTTTAWT J
AFFIANT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / [/,'

day of May,

1994
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Jill Fairbanks,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:
:
:

Roger R. Fairbanks,
Defendant.

:
:

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO: 914902005 DA
COMMISSIONER:
Michael S. Evans

The Commissioner having received proffers of testimony and argument from Counsel,
having taken the parties' respective requests under advisement to allow a review of the pleadings
on file and the exhibits submitted at hearing to allow a consideration of the parties respective
arguments, having reviewed the pleadings on file herein now
FINDS:
1.

Each party alleges the other party has engaged in inappropriate behavior during

the times that the children were exchanged for visitation and, given the ages of the children, an
order of "curb side" visitation appears to be in the children's best interests.
2.

The parties dispute whether defendant has substantially complied with the court's

order of visitation in accordance with the standard schedule, which identifies a friday 6:00 p.m.
starting date for visitation periods. It appears to be in the children's best interests that defendant
arrive no later than 7:00 p.m. on the date set for visitation and, in the event he should fail to
do so, that plaintiff be free to make other arrangements for the children.
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3.

PAGE TWO

MINUTE ENTRY

The Decree of Divorce specifically provides, in paragraph 4, defendant's

obligation to obtain life insurance, which life insurance defendant has failed to obtain simply
alleging that he cannot afford to do so.
4.

It appears that defendant was provided with plaintiff's request for reimbursement

regarding the children's medical bills, if not early then by way of pleadings submitted in support
of plaintiff s present motion, and it is reasonable that judgment be entered against defendant in
the amount of attorney's fees as prayed.
5.

It does not appear as though defendant has been delinquent in the payments of

child support in an amount equal to support owing for a thirty day period and within the
meaning of the statute and it is inappropriate to find such a delinquency has occurred and to
enter an order to withhold and deliver child support.
* 6.

The parties disagree with the interpretation of the Decree of Divorce as it relates

to the award of attorney's fees to plaintiff. The Decree of Divorce in paragraph 15 orders
defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of $3,000.00 as a contribution to plaintiffs attorney's fees
and sets forth a paymeiit schedule. The final sentence of paragraph 15, which is the disputed
language provides, "In*'the event the defendant becomes more than thirty days delinquent in
payment of said obligation for attorney's fees and costs, then plaintiff shall be entitled to obtain
a judgment against defendant for the unpaid balance owing . . .". Plaintiff argues that any
thirty day delinquency in any of the payments pursuant to schedule allows her to seek a
judgment for any unpaid balance of the original $3,000.00 award, while defendant argues that
only those payments which were due according to the schedule of payments may be reduced to

0 0040 0
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MINUTE ENTRY

judgment. The Commissioner finds that the Decree is appropriately interpreted to require that
any unpaid balance owing of the $3,000.00 attorney's fees awarded at the time of a thirty day
delinquency, which has in fact occurred, is the appropriate interpretation of the Decree.
7.

The parties also dispute the language of paragraph 16 of the Decree of Divorce

regarding the right to claim the parties' minor children as dependents for tax purposes.
Paragraph 16 provides, in pertinent part, "The defendant is awarded the right to purchase the
tax exemptions for the parties' minor children from plaintiff. Defendant may exercise this right
by paying to plaintiff any difference in her tax liability resulting from defendant purchasing the
right to claim said tax exemptions."
The parties' dispute in this regard stems from plaintiff's remarriage and her argument
that, although she remains substantially unemployed and generating minimal income for herself,
that the tax liability resulting from her present husband's income is her shared liability and that
only by defendant repaying all of the additional tax liability resulting from plaintiff and her
present husband not claiming the children as their dependents are the terms of the Decree of
Divorce fulfilled. Defendant argues, conversely, that it is only any tax liability plaintiff in her
own name and as a result of her own earnings that he is required to reimburse.
8.

The child support award entered in this matter was entered pursuant to Utah's

Child Support Guidelines attributing no income to plaintiff and requiring that defendant pay one
hundred percent of the guideline amount of support.

ts w 0 1 0 1
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MINUTE ENTRY

Since the Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter the Child Support

Guidelines with respect to the award of the children as dependents for tax purposes has been
amended and provides some further direction to the court. Section 78-45-7.21(2) provides, "In
awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency shall consider: (a) as the primary
factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the cost of raising the child; and (b) among
other factors, the relative tax benefit to each parent." (emphasis added)
The appropriate interpretation of the disputed language as contained in the Decree of
Divorce is as the defendant argues: that only the tax liability of these parents is to be considered
in determining the amount, if any, defendant is to reimburse plaintiff for the right to claim the
children as his dependents.

Only if plaintiffs present husband's income is included in

determining defendant's child support obligation would it be fair and consistent with the intent
of the guidelines to allow the court to consider plaintiffs husband's tax liability in the award of
the children as dependent's for tax purposes.
RECOMMENDS:
1.

The parties be restrained from having any contact with one another during times

the children are exchanged for periods of visitation and that defendant arrive at plaintiffs home
at the appointed time, in no event later than 7:00 p.m. when the visitation is to commence at
6:00 p.m., and remain in his vehicle while plaintiff sends the children out, with the process to
be repeated at the end of any visitation period.

c
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In the event defendant arrives more than one hour past the scheduled time for

visitation, plaintiff be free to make other arrangements for the children.
3.

The issue of defendant's contempt for failure to obtain life insurance as ordered

in the Decree of Divorce be certified for further hearing before the assigned judge. Defendant
may purge himself of any finding of contempt in this regard by his forthwith obtaining life
insurance consistent with the Decree of Divorce.
4.

Plaintiff be awarded judgment against defendant in the sum of $755.00

representing one half of the children's uninsured medical expense. The issue of defendant's
contempt in this regard be reserved pending his future performance.
5.

Defendant be admonished to abide by the terms of the Decree of Divorce in

promptly make all payments of child support on the date due. The issue of defendant's contempt
in this regard should be reserved pending his future performance.
6.

Plaintiff be awarded judgment against defendant in the sum of $3,000.00, together

with judgment rate of interest, representing attorney's fees due, owing but unpaid pursuant to
the Decree of Divorce.
7.

Defendant's Motion to Compel Reimbursement of sums paid to plaintiff

representing reimbursement to plaintiff for her tax liability resulting from not claiming the
parties' minor children as her dependents for tax purposes be granted and plaintiff return,
forthwith, that portion of the sums defendant previously paid which represent additional tax
liability attributable to plaintiff's present husband. In the event plaintiff herself incurred any
additional tax liability on her earnings as a result of not claiming the children as her
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dependents for tax purposes, said sum should not be repaid to defendant.
8.

Each party bear their own attorney's fees and costs for this hearing.

9.

Plaintiffs Counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this recommendation.

Dated this

\ [f

day of August, 1994.

Michael S. Evans
District Court Commissioner
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry,
postage prepaid, to the following this

\ Lfl day of August, 1994.

Frederick N. Green
GREEN & BERRY
Attorney for Plaintiff
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Roger R. Fairbanks
Defendant
594 West Murray Boulevard, Apt. 1-K
Murray, UT 84123
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GREEN & BERRY
FREDERICK N. GREEN (124 0)
SUSAN C. BRADFORD (53 77)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5650
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JILL FAIRBANKS,
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSIVE
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS
OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S
RECOMMENDATION

VS.

Civil No.

91-4902005 DA

ROGER R. FAIRBANKS,
Judge Michael Murphy
Defendant.
The Plaintiff files the following responsive memorandum
pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration in
support of its motion objecting to the recommendation of the
Commissioner.
INTRODUCTION
At the time of the divorce, the parties stipulated that the
Plaintiff would be awarded the exemptions associated with the
minor children subject to the Defendant's right to "purchase11 the
exemptions by reimbursing the Plaintiff for the increased taxes
associated with the loss of the exemptions.

The issue is whether

or not the calculation of increased taxes would be based upon the
Plaintiff's joint income tax return filed with her husband, or
the estimated or speculative tax consequence if the Plaintiff
were to have filed a married/separate income tax return.

Commissioner Evans has recommended that the tax consequences be
based upon only the Plaintiff's tax liability, if she were to
have filed a married/separate return, and excluding her husband's
income.x
FACTS
1.

The parties were divorced December 20, 1991.

2.

The divorce was by stipulation and contained the

following provision:
The Defendant is awarded the right to
purchase the tax exemptions for the parties'
minor chidlren from Plaintiff. Defendant may
exercise this right by paying to Plaintiff
any difference in her tax liability resulting
from Defendant purchasing the right to claim
said tax exemptions. In order to implement
this provision, the parties are ordered as
follows: Each party shall exchange W-2 forms
for the previous tax year no later than the
end of February of the following year.
Plaintiff is ordered to prepare her tax
return and provide Defendant with a copy by
the end of February as required for the W-2
exchange herein. Defendant shall then have
fifteen (15) days in which to elect to
purchase any or all of the tax exemptions for
the parties' minor chidlren. Defendant is
ordered to notify Plaintiff by March 15th of
his intent to purchase any of said exemptions
and shall pay the expense Plaintiff incurs to
have her tax return recalculated as a result
of defendant's election to purchase any or
all of said exemptions. Plaintiff is ordered
to execute all necessary forms/documents so
as to implement the provisions of this
paragraph. Further, Defendant is ordered to
pay Plaintiff the sums owing to Plaintiff as
the result of his purchase of any or all
exemptions no later than April 10th of each
year.

This matter was taken under advisement. In so doing, the
Commissioner acknowledged that it was a case of first impression for the
Commissioner.
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3.

The Plaintiff has remarried.

4.

The Plaintiff has filed a married/joint tax return.

5.

The Plaintiff is and was substantially unemployed

during the year 1993.
6.

The Plaintiff's husband has assisted the Plaintiff in

caring for her children and his step-children, rather than
requiring the Defendant to work.
7.

Child support is based upon the imputation of income to

the Plaintiff at $731 per month in spite of her actual work
status.
8.

The Plaintiff and her husband have determined that

there will be significant tax savings if they file a
married/joint return, rather than the parties each filing a
married/separate return.
9.

There has been no determination and no evidence

provided by either party as to the relative contribution between
the Defendant, or the Plaintiff's household, for the cost of
raising the minor children.
10.

Child support was stipulated to and has been paid

pursuant to the child support guidelines in existence prior to
July 1, 1994. 2
11.

The Plaintiff and her current husband acknowledge that

they are bound by the provisions of §78-45-4.1, Utah Code Ann.
(1953 as amended), as follows:
9

It appears that the Commissioner has based his recommendation in
large part upon the policies of the child support guidelines which were
amended July 1, 1994 as they relate to the award of exemptions.
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A step-parent shall support a step child to
the same extent that a natural or adoptive
parent is required to support a child.
(emphasis added)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT'S SUGGESTION, AND THE
COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION, WHICH WOULD
IGNORE THE CONTRIBUTION OF A STEP-PARENT, IS
CONTRARY TO THE LAW OF THIS STATE, THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AND EQUITY.
The Defendant's position, as well as the recommendation of
the Commissioner, rests upon one pivotal, but flawed argument,
to-wit:

"Plaintiff . . . does not contribute financially to the

cost of raising the parties four minor children."

See

Defendant's pro se Reply Memorandum, page 4.
The Internal Revenue Code allocates dependency exemptions
between divorced or separated parents in §152(c) I.R.C.

The

requirements are: (1) that one or both parents provided more than
half the cost to support the child; (2) the parents must be
divorced or legally separated; and, (3) one or both parents must
have custody of the children more than half of the year.
I.R.C. §152(e)(5) states that for purposes of requirement
(1), above, support received from a parent's spouse upon
remarriage is treated as having been received from the parent.
The general rule is that the custodial parent is entitled to
the exemption.

Temp. Reg. §1.152-4 T(a)(26 C.F.R.), Q-l; I.R.C.

§152(e)(1).
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Section 78-45-4.1, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) places
upon the step-parent the "same duty as a natural parent" to
support step-children.

The Eyrings (the Plaintiff and her

current spouse, who is the step-parent of the four minor children
of these parties) have elected, for their personal reasons, to
have the step-parent satisfy his statutory obligation and for the
Plaintiff to essentially be unemployed.
I.R.C

In keeping with the

§152(e)(5) and §78-45-4.1, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as

amended), this court should view contributions to the support of
the minor children based upon the contributions of a household,
or the combination of the Plaintiff and her husband.

The

Defendant fails to acknowledge the tax treatment of contributions
made by a step-parent, as well as the requirements of Utah law,
in fashioning a strained and overly technical argument.
POINT III.
THE COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION DOES NOT
DEAL WITH THE TAX TREATMENT OF CONTRIBUTIONS
OF A STEP-PARENT, OR THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH
LAW AT ALL.
Very simply, in the eyes of the Internal Revenue Service,
according to the law of Utah, and reasonable expectation of these
parties, the reference in the Decree to "parent" for purposes of
tax exemptions, must include the parent and the step-parent, at
least where the step-parent is obviously contributing to the
support of the step children (in light of the unemployment of the
natural parent).
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Consistent with the Internal Revenue Code and the laws of
this state and the reasonable expectation of the parties, the
Plaintiff files a joint tax return with her husband.
"her tax return under the Decree.11

This is

The Plaintiff is jointly and

severally liable for taxes due, penalties, and the like.

If

there is a tax obligation (due to the loss of the exemptions),
the Plaintiff is liable for that change and increased tax.

A

married/joint return has been determined to be advantageous to
the Plaintiff and her husband.

The filing status of

married/joint is, in fact, what the Plaintiff and her husband do.
This should all be compared with the fiction that the Defendant
engages in when suggesting that the tax liability of the "parent"
be based upon the pretend filing of a married/separate return
which would disadvantage the Plaintiff and her husband, indeed
the family.
The Defendant's argument, incredibly, must assume that the
parties contemplated that neither of them would become married in
the future.

Such an assumption, in addition to being incorrect,

is unrealistic.

The Defendant has remarried.

If the court were

to adopt the Defendant's argument, then any tax advantage that he
would gain by claiming the exemptions would also have to be based
upon a married/separate return, rather than the likely
married/joint return that he would want to file at that time.
If the aim of this provision and like provisions in other
decrees is to maximize the available income to the parties, the
application of the Defendant's argument, in reality, does not
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accomplish that.

Furthermore, if the Defendant truly believes

that the remarriage of the Plaintiff was not contemplated in the
Decree, then it would certainly constitute a substantial and
material change in circumstance which would require the
modification of the Decree.

Judicial economy and equity would

suggest that such a course is unnecessary.
The Commissioner's recommendation suggests that including
the step-parent's income in determining the tax consequence of
claiming or not claiming the exemptions would require the
inclusion of step-parent income for child support determination.
This is not so.

In cases of imputed income, and similar

language, the court does not suggest that the imputed income be
the basis for estimating taxes and tax consequences.

Rather, in

this case, the basis of the Commissioner's recommendation assumes
that the Plaintiff's income is zero (which is reality), rather
than the imputed amount (which is fiction).

The Defendant's

position then takes the best of both worlds for his benefit
regardless of reality and regardless of how such an argument
impacts the four minor children.
CONCLUSION
In light of I.R.C. §152(e)(5) and §78-45-4.1, Utah Code Ann.
(1953 as amended), the court should calculate the Plaintiff's tax
consequences based upon her joint return.
joint and several obligation.

The joint return is a

Any taxes due or consequences

flowing from the filing of a joint tax return are the
Plaintiff's.

The Defendant ought not to prevail on an
-7-

inequitable and internally inconsistent argument.

The

Defendant's argument is, at least, overly technical and does not
reflect the reality of the parties' experience.

Finally, the

Defendant's argument does not consider the best interests of the
children because it does not maximize the tax savings available
to the parties.
DATED THIS

/

day of September, 1994.
GREEN y& BERRY

FR^IDERISK NT^REEN
(&£xorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss
)

Audree D. Askee, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY,
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served the attached
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSIVE MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS OBJECTION TO
COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION upon the following parties by
placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed
to:
Roger R. Fairbanks, Esq.
Defendant Pro Se
8543 South 890 East
Sandy, Utah 84 094
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the
J

day of September, 1994.

C\

(

•i

•'~CN:

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
September, 1994.

]

M

day of

-y

7i-n

£1

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah

FNGMisc\Fairbank.Ord
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
FAIRBANKS, JILL
PLAINTIFF
VS
FAIRBANKS, ROGER R

CASE NUMBER 914902005 DA
DATE 10/24/94
HONORABLE MICHAEL R MURPHY
COURT REPORTER GAYLE CAMPBELL
COURT CLERK MGS

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
OBJ. TO COM. RULING
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
P. ATTY. GREEN, FREDERICK N
D. ATTY. FAIRBANKS, ROGER (PRO SE)

THIS BEING THE TIME SET FOR HEARING ON THE OBJECTION'S TO THE
COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATIONS.
BASED ON THE ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL AND PARTIES, THE COURT
ORDERS THE OBJECTIONS ARE OVERRULED. FREDERICK GREEN IS TO
PREPARE THE ORDER.

